This paper investigates the tariff pass-through mechanism and household welfare in urban China. We estimate how market structure, specifically the size of the private sector, affects the transmission of prices from the border to consumers by using household survey data from urban China. Our results suggest that the tariff pass-through rates at the border are higher than the pass-through on consumer prices, and an increase in competition in Chinese cities is associated with higher tariff pass-through rates. This effect works both through the distribution sector, and through the manufacturing sector of the final goods. By incorporating the changes in consumer prices of tradable and nontradable goods, we next investigate how trade liberalization affects household welfare through changes in the cost of consumption. The results show that WTO accession of China was associated with welfare gains to almost every household across the per capita expenditure spectrum, and that the distributional effect is strongly pro-poor. The average welfare gain of WTO accession on Chinese households is estimated to be 7.5 percent.
Introduction
Trade liberalization along the border could affect households and individuals through two main channels.
First, through the income channel, trade policies affect household welfare through wages and employment, and second, through the consumption channel, trade policies affect household welfare by influencing the prices of goods consumed by the household (United Nations, 2012) . Although the income effect has been intensively explored in the literature (i.e., Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Zhu and Trefler, 2005; Hanson, 2007; Verhoogen, 2008; Topalova, 2010; Han, Liu and Zhang, 2012) , consumption effect of trade liberalization through price changes is understudied. 1 Recent studies have suggested, however, that the price effect might be essential in estimating the welfare gains of trade. Broda and Weinstein (2008) and Broda, Leibtag, and Weinstein (2009) show that, contrary to common beliefs, adjusting income and poverty measures to account for prices paid by each individual, reveals that Americans in every income group are substantially better off than they were before. Faber (2012) finds that access to cheap U.S. inputs reduces the relative price of higher quality products, and thus, leads to a significant increase in Mexican real income inequality. The current paper contributes to the literature by using Chinese urban household survey data to study empirically the welfare gains of trade liberalization through changes in consumer prices.
Reductions in import tariff rates may reduce domestic prices, and improve consumer welfare if markets can transmit the price changes from the border to consumers. However, imperfections in the market mechanism often lead to imperfect pass-through rates. Whether or not a household benefit from trade liberalization depends on the structure and the efficiency of the product market in which the consumption goods are being produced and sold. The literature on tariff pass-through focused on trade costs related to the geographic characteristics of localities, such as the distance to the border (Nicita, 2009; Atkin and Donaldson, 2012) , or the relative isolation of markets in rural versus urban settings (Ural 1 The literature has examined the impact of trade liberalization on labor income (Hanson, 2007) , on wage inequality, (Han, Liu, and Zhang; Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding, 2013; Verhoogen, 2008; Zhu and Trefler; , on poverty (Hasan et al. 2007; McCaig, 2011; Topalova, 2010) , and on employment (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003) . See Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for surveys of the literature. Marchand, 2012) . This paper contributes to the literature by offering novel evidence on the role of market structure, specifically the size of the private sector, in the domestic economy, that determines the tariff pass-through.
If domestic industries are imperfectly competitive, changes in tariffs may be absorbed by profit margins or markups (Campa and Goldberg, 2002) . In this case, prices may not decrease to reflect the full extent of tariff reductions, even in the absence of other frictions in the market. Atkin and Donaldson (2012) have further shown how the market power of intermediaries in domestic industries affects the markups, and hence results in different rates of tariff pass-through within sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of China, a more relevant market imperfection is the share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the domestic industries. A heavily regulated domestic industry that is dominated by the state would have limited flexibility to adjust to the changing cost conditions (Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011) . In contrast, a rising private sector has created markets and accelerated competition in China (Naughton, 1994; Jin and Qian, 1998; Park, Li, and Tse, 2006) , which is expected to improve the ability of domestic markets to transfer the tariff reductions to consumers.
The substantial Chinese trade liberalization, accompanied by the reform of SOEs, provides a unique setting to analyze the role of private sector in the tariff pass-through, and to assess the welfare gains of trade liberalization through price changes. First, China has been consistently opening its economy since the early 1990s, as exemplified by its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession in 2001. Figure 1 presents the trends in the average tariff rates for major tradable goods in China, namely, Food and Beverage, Clothing and Household Equipment. Each category has experienced profound tariff cuts from 1992 to 2008. Particularly, the average tariff cut due to WTO accession was 38% from 2000 to 2002.
Second, China has been transforming from a centrally-planned into a market-oriented economy since the early 1990s (Fan and Wei, 2006; Han, 2006; Brandt and Rawski, 2008) . A unique feature of the transition process in China is the reallocation of resources from SOEs to enterprises outside the state sector (Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu, 2008) . The relative size of the private sector in urban China has increased from 24% in 1992 to 50% in 2008 (see Figure 2 ). This paper contributes to the literature by studying how the substantial tariff reductions affect households through price changes, and more importantly, how the tariff reductions interact with the expansion of the private sector.
The empirical approach in this paper develops on the methodology used in Deaton (1989) , Porto (2006) , Nicita (2009) , and Ural Marchand (2012) . Following the framework provided by Burstein and Gopinath (2014) , the paper first investigates the Chinese tariff pass-through mechanism and estimates how market structure (specifically the share of the private sector) affects the transmission of prices of tradable goods from border to consumer by using urban household survey data. We identify the potential mechanisms that lead to imperfect tariff pass-through, and investigate the importance of private share in the distribution sector and in the manufacturing sector of final goods. In addition to tradable commodities, nonradable services have gradually become an important part of the household consumption basket in urban China. Hence, this paper incorporates nontradable services into our welfare analysis by estimating how the prices of nontradables respond to the price changes of tradables in general equilibrium. Finally, the paper uses household survey data to estimate the welfare effects on each household according to the importance of these tradable and nontradable goods in their consumption basket. The paper further investigates the distribution of these welfare estimates across the expenditure spectrum to assess the distributional effects of trade reforms in China through the consumption channel.
Our results suggest that reductions in tariffs are not perfectly transmitted to consumer prices. The average pass-through rate is found to be 20 percent in a city where all enterprises are state owned, and a 10 percent increase in the size of the private sector is associated with 2.5 percent higher tariff passthrough. A city with an average size of the private sector has an approximate tariff pass-through rate of 31 percent. We find that the tariff pass-through rate is substantially higher for the border prices when compared to consumer prices, confirming that mechanisms of the domestic market play an important role.
Further, the results suggest that the share of private sector in the distribution sector, and in the final goods production, are both important factors, while the effect of distribution sector is found to be much higher.
When the differences of market structure across cities are considered, the results show that tariff passthrough rates vary substantially across Chinese cities, ranging from 20 to 39 percent. In addition, the results also suggest that the prices of nontraded services, such as Health, Transportation and Housing, are significantly affected by the changes in traded good prices.
Even with the relatively restrictive price transmission, we show that China's accession to the WTO has a pro-poor impact on household welfare. The poorest households at the left end of the distribution experience a 11.3 percent gain in their welfare relative to their initial welfare. This effect monotonically decreases along the per capita expenditure distribution until it is insignificantly different than zero for better-off households at the right end of the distribution. The average welfare effect of WTO accession is estimated to be 7.5 percent. In addition, households are affected mainly through the prices of traded goods, rather than nontraded services, as the expenditure shares of these services are relatively low and the response rate of nontraded prices is relatively small. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature and outline the mechanism of tariff pass-through. In Section 3, we provide empirical evidence on the role of market structure in tariff pass-through. In Section 4, we estimate the price elasticities of nontradable goods. In Section 5, we assess the consumption effects of trade liberalization in urban China. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature and Mechanisms
In most countries, changes in trade policy are not fully reflected in domestic consumer prices. The literature has emphasized imperfect competition among foreign exporters, and a tariff-induced change in a country's terms of trade as the major reasons for tariff pass-through rates that are less than unity (Feenstra, 1989 and 1995) . However, there are only a few papers in the literature that have studied how domestic factors affect the pass-through of tariff rates. These studies focus on the role of trade costs, particularly the distance of households from the border or nearest port (Nicita, 2009; Atkin and Donaldson, 2012) , and the relative isolation of households from functioning product markets in rural versus urban areas (Ural Marchand, 2012) .
These papers document how trade policy influences households varies greatly across different regions, even though tariffs are reduced at the national level. Nicita (2009) finds that tariff pass-through was significantly higher in the Mexican states closest to the United States border, and thus households living in these states benefited relatively more from the reductions in tariffs. Atkin and Donaldson (2012) find that intra-national trade costs in Africa are extremely high, which leads to welfare loss for isolated locations. Pass-through estimates in India suggest that reductions in tariffs increased domestic consumer welfare more in urban areas relative to rural areas (Ural Marchand, 2012) . However, there are no studies that investigate the role of market structure in the domestic market. The current paper contributes to the literature by estimating how the change in market structure, specifically the changing size of the private sector, influences tariff pass-through.
Following Burstein and Gopinath (2014) , the change in the consumer prices of a good imported from country to country can be decomposed as follows:
where is the retail or consumer price, is the producer price, is the share of distribution costs in the pre-markup retail price, is the price of distribution services, and is the gross retail markup. If we aggregate the prices over all tradable goods:
where is the average consumer price of tradable goods, is the aggregate share of distribution costs, is the share of expenditures on imported goods, is the producer price, and is the weighted average of import border prices.
A reduction in tariff rate first reduces the border prices, . This transmission can be less than perfect if the foreign exporters exhibit pricing-to-market behavior. In this case, the exporter firms may not allow the tariff reduction to be fully reflected on the border prices if they are imperfectly competitive ( ( ) / < 1). This is widely documented in the literature in case of exchange rate pass-through (Berman et al. 2012; Goldberg and Verboven 2001; Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; Gopinath et al., 2010; Hellerstein, 2008) , and for tariff pass-through (Feenstra, 1989) .
The tariff pass-through on tradable consumer prices, , may be even lower than the tariff passthrough on border prices for the following reasons. First, a reduction in tariffs may increase the expenditure share of imported goods if they are imperfect substitutes for domestically produced products (∆ /∆ < 0). Second, the prices of domestically produced goods, , may not be very sensitive to changes in tariff rates (Campa and Goldberg, 2006) . This could happen if the domestic sector is imperfectly competitive, and firms do not fully respond to the reduction in import prices.
In the earlier literature, Dornbush (1987) showed that exchange rate pass-through is smaller in less competitive domestic markets. Lee (1997) later empirically tested this prediction and found that industries with higher concentration have lower exchange rate pass-through rates in Korea. A monopoly or an oligopolistic firm in a large country such as China may also expect to affect the world prices, and as a result absorb some of the price reductions induced by lower tariffs if the demand is highly elastic. Auer (2012) finds that the transmission from border prices to producer prices in China is imperfect with an elasticity around 0.70 percent. Bernhofen and Xu (2000) conclude that significant market power exercised by the firms results in an imperfect exchange rate pass-through onto domestic prices. 2
In addition, the tariff reductions may increase the competition among intermediaries, reducing wholesale and retail markups ( / < 0), and reducing the distribution costs ( / < 0).
The share of distribution cost can be a substantial share of the total cost, and significantly dampen the pass-through rates. Burstein et al. (2003) and Campa and Goldberg (2010) show that distribution margins are important in determining the extent to which exchange rates pass-through on consumer prices. This paper focuses on how the local market structure, in particular, privatization, affects tariff pass-through into consumer prices. The link between the private sector share and market competition has often been proposed in the literature. Naughton (1994) finds that the entry of non-state-owned industrial firms play a crucial role in China's reform process by creating markets and competition. Jin and Qian (1998) analyze the public and private firms in the rural area. They find that the proportion of public firms (township-village enterprises, or TVEs) to private enterprises is higher when the influence of the central government is larger, the community government power is stronger, and the level of market development is more delayed. Park, Li, and Tse (2006) regard the decentralization of government control and ownership restructuring as important institutional changes to implement market liberalization in China.
As privatization moves the economy towards a relatively more competitive equilibrium, the ability of domestic markets to translate the tariff reductions to the consumers is expected to improve. In this case, the market share of private firms is expected to increase the pass-through rate.
In addition, the price-setting behavior of state-owned firms may be different than private firms as the state has the additional distributional objectives. A firm owned by public maximizes an objective function that incorporates social welfare, while a privately owned firm maximizes only profits (Cavaliere and Scabrosetti, 2008) . In this case, the promotion of competition may be sacrificed to the objective of equity. The objective of social welfare would diminish the impact of tariff changes on domestic prices.
These considerations suggest that privatization should increase the tariff transmission through increased competition, both affecting the responsiveness of local producer prices and through more efficient price setting by domestic firms.
The most recent literature on the impact of trade-induced price changes on household welfare relies on negative compensating variation, i.e. the negative of the amount the household would need to maintain their welfare level prior to the policy change (Deaton, 1989) . A major advantage of this framework is the ability to maintain heterogeneity across households in terms of their consumption baskets and locations, which allows us to investigate the factors that enhance or mitigate the welfare impacts of the trade policy. Porto (2006) extends Deaton's framework to study the welfare impact of Mercosur free-trade zone on Argentinian households. He concludes that households do not substantially benefit from a reduction in cost of consumption, but rather they benefit from an increase in their wage incomes. Studies that incorporate imperfect tariff pass-through (Nicita 2009; Ural Marchand 2012) , and linkages between production and consumption decisions by households (Seshan, 2005) show that trade liberalization generally increases real incomes of households and reduces poverty rates. Nicita, Olarreaga and Porto (2014) analyze the protectionism in Sub-Saharan Africa and show that domestic trade policy tend to favor poor households, with the exception of Ethiopia.
In this paper, we apply this methodology to estimate the effect of trade liberalization on household welfare in urban China. Specifically, we offer the first study that estimates the welfare gains through changes in consumer prices in urban China. First, we estimate the imperfect pass-through of tariff cuts on the prices of tradable goods, and provide new evidence on the role of local market structure and the potential mechanisms. Second, we incorporate the nontradable goods into our welfare analysis by estimating how the prices of nontradable goods respond to the price changes of tradable goods. Finally, we provide estimations on the consumption effects of tariff cuts in urban China, and present evidence the distributional effects of Chinese trade policy.
Market structure and imperfect tariff pass-through
To understand the consumption effect of trade liberalization on Chinese households, we first explore how tariff cuts along the border are transmitted to domestic consumption prices. The estimating equation of tariff pass-through is as follows:
where is the domestic consumer price of traded good in city at time ; is the ad-valorem tariff rate of good and time ; is the U.S. export price of good at time . indicates city-year fixed effects that control for city-year level shocks common to all commodities. indicates city-good fixed effects that control for the unobserved heterogeneity that are specific to each city-good pairs, such as different preferences for certain good in each city. represents product specific trends to account for changes that affect producer cost of each product, such as availability of imported inputs, reduced factor prices or improved technology. In this framework, 1 is the coefficient for the average tariff pass-through elasticity that is uniform across all cities in urban China. 1 is expected to be positive and less than 1, which indicates the imperfect pass-through that has been documented in the literature (Feenstra, 1989; Porto, 2006; Nicita, 2009; and Ural Marchand, 2012) .
The current paper differs from the standard pass-through framework by estimating how the changes in the market structure at the city level affects the transmission of tariff cuts into local consumption prices. Specifically, we study the effect of the relative size of the private sector on the rate at which tariff reductions are transmitted to the consumers. This is a particularly important question for China as the country has been transforming from the centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented one since 1978 (Fan and Wei, 2006; Han, 2006; Brandt and Rawski, 2008) . At the outset of reform in 1978, the state sector accounted for 80 percent of urban employment and 76 percent of industrial output (Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu, 2008) . Along with the restructuring of the SOEs (particularly after 1997 when the 15 th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party formally sanctioned ownership reforms of the state-owned firms and legalized the development of private enterprises), the share of the SOEs has substantially decreased, while the share of domestic private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises has increased.
The share of total urban employment in private domestic and foreign enterprises increased from 8 to 24 percent between 1998 and 2007 (Zhu, 2012) .
In China, the transition towards a more competitive market-oriented economy did not occur uniformly across the country. There was substantial variation across regions due to the different degrees of reform implementation. The privatization rates, for example, varied between 8.1% in Guizhou and 42.2% in Jiangsu during 1999 to 2004 (Bai, Lu and Tao, 2009 ). This finding motivates our approach of incorporating across-city variation to assess the impact of tariff reductions on domestic prices.
Let define the fraction of the private sector in each city at time . Given our interest in the pass-through coefficients and how affects these pass-through coefficients, we interact with tariff rates. Thus, our estimating equation is as follows:
The estimated pass-through elasticity is:
where a positive � 2 indicates that the higher share of the private sector will enhance the degree of passthrough at the local level. The more privatized the local market, the larger the elasticity of tariff passthrough.
Domestic consumer prices are calculated as the unit values using the Chinese Urban Household (SITC) codes in the tariff data. 3 We use the ratio of expenditure to quantity to measure the unit price for each commodity consumed by each household. Then, we use the city-level averages of these unit prices as the dependent variable in our pass-through regression (1) and (2). An important advantage of our specification is to exploit a large variation of the unit prices of 35 tradable goods across cities and years to identify tariff pass-through elasticity.
Chinese tariff reduction since the 1990s is part of a broad set of external reforms culminating in WTO accession (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006; Brandt and Morrow, 2013 We use the relative size of the private sector to capture the change of the market structure in Chinese cities. This information is readily available in the UHS data. Based on each individual's working status, we calculate the proportion of workers in foreign or privately-owned enterprises, which can be used to evaluate the relative size of the private sector in each city. 5 Figure 2 presents the variation of this measure across cities and years, with the fitted line indicating the average city-level shares for each year.
The figure shows that while the private sector only comprised 22 percent of the economy in 1992, it constituted a significant part (nearly 50 percent) of the economy in 2008. The relative size of the private sector also varies considerably across cities in our sample. These variations provide sources of identification to estimate the geographical heterogeneity of tariff pass-through within China. Table 1 presents the benchmark results of the pass-through regression (3) and (4). For each regression, we report two specifications. In columns (1) and (2), we use city fixed effects to control for any city-specific factors that might affect consumer prices, and city-level GDP to control for any time variant demand and cost factors at the city level. In columns (3) and (4), we use city-year fixed effects to control for any time variant factors at the city level that might affect consumer prices. In columns (5) and (6), our preferred specification, we further add the good-city fixed effects to control for any unobserved heterogeneity for each good-city pairs. First, we find consistent evidence that tariff pass-through is imperfect. According to the column (5), the estimated average elasticity is 0.29, indicating that a 10 percent reduction in tariffs reduces consumer prices by 2.9 percent. Second, and more importantly, we find that the transmission of tariff reduction depends significantly on the relative size of the private sector at the city level. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the tariff cut and the size of the private sector is significantly positive, and a 10 percent increase in the size of the private sector is largest trading partner of China, and thus, its export prices are most relevant for Chinese trade. The United States International Trade Commission (USITC)'s FAS Value/First Unit Quantity definition is used as the world price. 5 Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu (2008) and Zhu (2012) use the share of urban employment in domestic private enterprises and foreigninvested enterprises to capture the transition of Chinese economy from central-planning to market orientation. associated with 2.5 percent higher tariff pass-through (column 6). A city that has an average sized private sector has an approximate tariff pass-through rate of 31 percent. 6 By contrast, a city in which all enterprises are state-owned has a tariff pass-through rate of only 20 percent. The first two columns of Table 6 further present the city-level pass-through rates and their standard deviations, respectively. Due to the differences in the degree of privatization, tariff pass-through rates in our sample vary substantially across cities, ranging from 20 percent to 39 percent. Furthermore, the coefficients of the control variables suggest that the domestic consumer prices of traded goods are negatively correlated to the size of the private sector, and positively correlated to world prices.
Our estimated pass-through elasticity for consumer price is within the range of those estimated for developing countries. For example, Nicita (2009) finds that the pass-through in Mexico is about 33 percent for agricultural products and about 27 percent for manufacturing. Ural Marchand (2012) finds that consumers in urban India are affected by tariff reductions with a pass-through elasticity that ranges from 64 to 68 percent. Our findings confirm that tariff pass-through elasticity varies considerably within a country. In particular, the degree of pass-through in urban China is affected by the degree of privatization at the local level.
Next, we explore the mechanism of imperfect tariff pass-through in urban China and the role of the private sector as outlined by the Equations (1) and (2). First, we estimate the degree of tariff passthrough into import prices on the border using the transaction-level Chinese Customs data from 2000-
2007.
The dataset provides the detailed information on the value and quantity for each imported HS8-digit product at each year, which we use to calculate the unit value for each product. We then use the concordance provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) to concord HS 6-digit product codes into SITC Rev3 4-digit product codes that are used in tariff data.
The estimated pass-through rate into import prices is reported in column (1) of Table ( 2). Indeed, we find evidence that the tariff pass-through rate into import prices is higher than the tariff pass-through rate into consumer prices as discussed Section 2. The average pass-through rate at the border is about 36 percent, which is higher than the estimated pass-through rate into consumer prices, 29 percent. This evidence is consistent with previous findings in Burstein and Gopinath (2014) and Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2012) .
Second, we explore possible channels through which the private sector affects the pass-through rate of tariff into consumer prices. We focus on two main channels. On one hand, the rising share of private sector in manufacturing of final goods could increase the competitiveness of domestic producers of final goods, and thus increase the responsiveness of consumer prices. As a result, the pass-through rate can be higher as the share of private sector in the final goods production increases in each city. On the other hand, the rising share of private sector in distribution sector could increase the competitiveness of domestic distributors and thus reduce the distribution costs and markups of the imported goods.
Therefore, the local pass-through rate at the city level can be higher as the share of private sector in distribution increases.
To study these two mechanisms, we use the UHS data to construct the share of private sector in the manufacturing sector and the share of private sector in the distribution sector for each city at each year during 1992-2008. We then interact these two measures with tariff reduction rates to explore the roles of private sector in tariff pass-through. The results are presented in columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 . The estimated coefficients of both interaction terms are significantly positive, indicating the validity of the two proposed channels. That is, the rising share of private sector in both the manufacturing of final goods and the distribution sectors helps increasing the pass-through of tariff reduction into consumer prices.
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the private share in manufacturing leads to 0.9 percent increase in tariff pass-through, while the same increase in the private share in distribution leads to a much higher increase of 2.1 percent in tariff pass-through onto consumer prices. This finding highlights the importance of the competition in distribution sector in understanding the tariff pass-through mechanism.
Last, we provide further robustness results in Table 3 to show that it is the share of private sector in each city, not other factors of a city, affects the incomplete tariff pass-through. Specifically, we consider three main factors that are often proposed in the literature (e.g., Atkin and Donaldson, 2012) : the advancement of communication facilities as measured by the number of telephones in each city, the level of transportation facilities as measured by the square-meter of roads in each city, and the share of urban sector as measured by the share of urban population in each city. All the city-level data are collected from Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. As Table 3 indicates, controlling for these other factors do not affect our main findings, that is, the share of private sectors significantly affects the degree of tariff pass-through in Chinese cities. In addition, we find that the development of communication and transportation facilities increase the tariff pass-through rates.
Price changes of nontradable goods
To evaluate the overall consumption effects of trade liberalization, we need to understand how the prices of nontradable goods respond to the price changes of tradable goods in general equilibrium. In this section, we start with estimating the following basic model to examine the general equilibrium effects on nontradable prices (Porto, 2006 ):
where is the price of nontradable good at city c in year t, is the price of traded good at city c in year t,
represents the year fixed effects, is the city fixed effects, and is the city-specific trend.
This model is estimated for each of the nontradable goods j separately. thus indicates elasticity of nontraded price to traded price . In this specification, we rely on the city and year fixed effects and city trend to control for any spurious correlations between the price of nontradable goods and that of tradable goods. However, fixed effects alone may not fully control for the time-series correlation between the price levels. Therefore, we further use the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation method to estimate the following regression (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Mileva, 2007) :
where we add the lagged log change in price of nontradable goods j to reflect the dynamic determination of the nontradable prices and we use ∆ , −2 and all the other covariates in the regression as instruments for ∆ , −1 (Mileva, 2007) . and Communication primarily arose from increased competition in telecommunication services (Loo, 2004) . Table 5 presents As pointed out in Porto (2006) , these elasticities reflect the complex responses of nontradable prices to tradable prices in general equilibrium. We offer one possible interpretation of these elasticities based on the classical trade theory, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (Dixit and Norman, 1980) . That is, different sectors have different intensity in factor usage (such as skilled versus unskilled labor), and thus, the price of one good will affect the price of another good through the factor market. Assume that Food 
Estimating the consumption effects of trade liberalization
The empirical results in the previous sections provide us with tariff pass-through estimates for tradable goods and the price elasticities of nontradable goods with respect to the price of tradable goods. Next, we estimate the overall consumption effects of the tariff reductions due to trade liberalization. The consumption effect of the tariff cut for each household h in city c is computed as follows:
where ℎ and ℎ are the expenditure shares of tradable goods i or non-tradable goods j for household h.
� 1 and � 2 represent the estimated tariff pass-through elasticities from Equation (2). ̂ is the estimated price elasticities of non-tradable goods from Equation (4) � ℎ provides an estimate of the negative compensating variation as a percentage of initial expenditure. In other words, this estimate provides the negative of the amount household ℎ must be compensated to maintain their welfare level prior to the policy change. A reduction in tariffs presumably yields welfare gains, so that � ℎ will be positive (provided that the pass-through coefficients are positive).
The overall consumption effect given by Equation (8) can be decomposed into two parts, which are welfare changes due to the consumption of tradable goods, and welfare changes due to the consumption of nontradable goods. Households experience heterogeneous welfare effects that are caused by three 9 In the baseline results we use the share of private sector employment for each city in 2006 as the data from 2006 cover more cities (2008 data has more missing values). However, using data in other years or using average share of private sector does not change the main implications of our findings. 10 We also experiment with different tariff reductions to estimate the total consumption effects on Chinese households. For example, we experiment with the tariff reduction between 1995 and 2002 because the Chinese government started to cut tariff to commit to the WTO standard in 1995 (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008) . We also tried the overall tariff reduction between 1992 and 2008. These sensitivity analyses do not change our baseline findings except that we find an even larger consumption effect of tariff cuts on Chinese households. factors: 1) households have different expenditure shares for each tradable and nontradable good; 2) each good experiences a different tariff reduction due to trade liberalization; and 3) these tariff reductions are transmitted differently to the domestic market depending on the extent of privatization in each city.
We use Chinese Urban Household Surveys to estimate the consumption effect of trade liberalization for each household. In these surveys, each household is required to report the amount of expenditure on several categories of goods and services. Figure 3 presents our findings, which show the total consumption effect of WTO accession across the entire distribution of log per capita expenditure. We find that WTO accession generates welfare gains through the consumption channel for Chinese households almost across the entire distribution. In particular, we find that poorer households experience higher gains from the consumption effect of tariff reduction relative to wealthier households. The average compensating variation for poor households can be as high as 11.3 percent of the initial expenditure and it decreases monotonically until it is not significantly different than zero for households at the right end of the distribution. As poorer households spend a higher proportion of their income on tradable goods such as food, clothes and household appliances, the tariff reduction passes through to lower consumption costs of these products, which allows poorer households to benefit more from globalization. Overall, our finding indicates that the distributional effect of China's WTO accession through the consumption effect is propoor.
The total consumption effect is disaggregated into the effects of traded and nontraded goods in Figure 4 . The magnitudes of the effects show that almost the entire welfare gain is driven by the direct impact of tariff cuts on the consumption of traded goods. The welfare effect through the consumption of nontradable goods is close to zero and always less than 1 percent. This can be explained by two reasons.
First, the expenditure shares of these goods are still small, even though it has been increasing significantly since the early 1990s. Second, the prices of nontradables, particularly Education, are not very responsive to the changes in tradable prices as shown in Section 4. This could be due to government regulations in non-tradable sectors, such as Education (Mok, 2005) . Moreover, the distributional effect of traded goods is pro-poor, while nontraded goods exhibit a bimodal distribution across the per capita expenditure distribution. This is driven by the fact that households at low-medium and high-medium parts of the expenditure distribution allocate the highest percentage of their budget to nontraded services. 12
Our paper extends the findings from the existing literature on other developing countries. Porto (2006) provides evidence on the pro-poor consumption effects on the tradable goods for Argentinian households. However, he finds pro-rich consumption effects on nontradable goods. Nicita (2009) documents overall pro-rich distributional effects, although these effects are primarily driven by the income channel instead of the consumption channel. Ural Marchand (2012) finds pro-poor distributional effects through the consumption of tradable goods for rural and urban India. In the case of China, we provide the first evidence on the pro-poor distributional effect of trade liberalization through consumption of both tradable and nontradable goods.
In this paper, we focus on estimating the price effects of trade liberalization through consumption.
We find that tariff cuts due to China's WTO accession has been partially transmitted to domestic consumption prices, and thus, benefits the average Chinese household, particularly the poor. Other papers in the literature have focused on examining how trade liberalization affects individuals/households through the income channel, such as wage and wage inequality (i.e., Zhu and Trefler, 2005; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Verhoogen, 2008; Topalova, 2010; and Han, Liu and Zhang, 2012) . For example, Han, Liu and Zhang (2012) find that China's WTO accession increases wage inequality in urban China. Our findings complement these previous findings to illustrate a more complex picture of the distributional impact of trade liberalization. They indicate that trade liberalization can potentially affect household welfare through different channels, and that the structure of local markets is an important factor as it affects the extent to which the potential benefits of trade policy are transmitted to the households. Table 6 presents the average consumption gains across cities which are computed according to Equation (8). To examine the sources of the total consumption gains, we present the city-level tariff passthrough elasticities, average expenditure shares and average consumption effects for both tradable and nontradable goods. Consistent with the findings shown in Figure 3 , all welfare gains are positive for all cities in the sample. The average welfare gain due to China's accession into WTO is approximately 7.5 percent. More importantly, these welfare gains are distributed unevenly across cities. To summarize the geographical distribution of the welfare gain, we classify these cities in our sample into two groups:
coastal cities (i.e., cities located within 500 km from the nearest port) and inland cities (i.e., cities located beyond 500 km from the nearest port). We find that households in coastal cities gain more from the WTO accession compared with households in inland cities. Higher welfare gains for coastal cities are largely driven by the higher tariff pass-through ratios relative to inland cities, and not by the different consumption patterns between coastal and inland cities.
Our findings on the geographical variation of tariff pass-through and welfare gains confirm and extend the findings in the previous literature. For example, Nicita (2009) shows that the pass-through rates of tariffs and welfare gains increase as Mexican households live closer to the US-Mexico border. Atkin and Donaldson (2012) find that the costs of intranational trade are extremely high in remote locations in Africa, and high trade costs reduce the consumer surplus in isolated locations. Ural Marchand (2012) finds that the transmission elasticities and welfare gains are higher in urban areas than that in rural areas. In this paper, we provide new evidence that this geographical variation can be driven not only by distance but also by the market structure of the local economy. This highlights that, in understanding the imperfections in the price transmission mechanism, the structure of the local economy may be as important as the geographical frictions that affect trade costs. In China, the coastal regions have higher pass-through rate (about 37 percent on average) due to the higher shares of foreign or privately-owned enterprises. Therefore, these coastal cities enjoy higher welfare gains due to the decrease in consumption prices. On the other hand, inland cities lack the market dynamics, and thus, have lower pass-through rate of tariff (about 29 percent on average). Therefore, these cities experience lower welfare gains through the consumption channel.
Conclusion
China's twin policies of liberalizing trade and reforming its state-owned enterprises enhanced the level of competition and efficiency within the domestic economy. However, the existing literature has yet to study how tariff reductions affect households, and more importantly, how trade liberalization interacts with the growth of the private sector. This paper contributes to the literature by documenting that the increased share of private sector enhances the ability of markets to transmit tariff reductions onto domestic prices, and consequently, increases the extent to which households benefit from trade liberalization.
By allowing different pass-through elasticities across Chinese cities, this paper shows that domestic prices decrease more in cities with a higher share of the private sector. The tariff pass-through elasticity is estimated to be quite small, around 20 percent, in a city in which all enterprises are stateowned. The tariff pass-through elasticity increases by 2.5 percentage points for each 10 percentage point increase in the share of the private sector. When the changes in the market structure across cities are considered, the increase in household welfare induced by the trade policy at the city level, varies between 20 and 39 percent. Furthermore, incorporating the price changes of tradable and nontradable goods, the paper shows that China's WTO accession has reduced the cost of consumption for all households. The distributional effect through this channel is highly pro-poor as low-expenditure households experienced the highest welfare gain due to tariff reductions.
Figure 1: Average Tariff Rates for Major Tradable Goods
Notes: The figure presents the average Chinese effective tariff rates for three major tradable goods for years [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Tariff rates at the 4-digit SITC level are extracted from WITS and then aggregated to the three major categories of tradable goods using the concordance provided in Appendix Table 1 . Import values are used as the weight for the aggregation. Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of domestic consumer prices of product i at city c in year t. Estimated coefficients are reported with robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of import prices for column (1) and the logarithm of domestic consumer prices of product i at city c in year t for columns (2) and (3). Estimated coefficients are reported with robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of domestic consumer prices of product i at city c in year t. Estimated coefficients are reported with robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Notes: Specifications (1)-(4) are estimated in price levels, while specifications (1')-(4') are estimated in first differences using Arellano-Bond estimation method. Estimated coefficients are reported with robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
